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and Deception 
(Under the direction of Dr. Gary Marks) 
  
The cultural industries and policies of France are 
undergoing major changes due to increased globalization and 
Americanization of markets since the end of World War II. 
The trade related audiovisual policies France acribes can be 
seen as ineffective. What causes this I asserts is a 
combination cultural path dependancy and the growing need to 
react to global pressures. As it turns out the policies of 
France are motivated by both stated and unstated goals, 
rendering the policies unable to meet expectations. It is 
expected that until an alteration of goals or policies is 
made France will continue to experience poor performance 
regarding its trade related audiovisual policies. 
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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The cultural industries and policies of France are 
undergoing major changes due to increased globalization and 
Americanization of markets since the end of World War II. 
France, which created its ministry of Culture in 1958, uses 
this body to steer the culture movement of the French 
populace Loosely, 230). Through its policies it aims to 
endow the populace with the necessary cultural identity to 
grow and mature into what is loosely determined to be 
essentially French. While culture cannot be reduced to art 
alone, art does allow individuals to grasp their surrounding 
environment and social relationship, and empower them to act 
both individually and collectively and to share a collective 
memory (Poirrier, 2002) It is no surprise therefore that the 
artistic creations of France, deemed to be a part of their 
culture, are protected by various mechanisms. Film are 
television which are made for the very purpose of embodying 
social cultural and ideological values holds a very serious 
key to understanding “being” in France (Dagnaud, p18, 2004)  
Very few tools used for the purpose of sensitzing the French 
 to positive and unique values are more effective than those 
belonging in the Audiovisual sector.  
French citizens watch an average of 22 hours of 
television a week (Donnant 1997:1), and in 2004 the entire 
french population went to the movies 194 million times (EAO 
2005: 35). The film industry in France is also held to be 
one of the most “artistic”, legendary and pioneering 
industries in the world, having created the first film in 
1895 and responsible for many internationaly reknowned 
actors, directors and producers like Depardieu, Aimé, 
Truffaut, Goddard, Pathé Gaumont, and others (Vernier). 
Lately, however the status of the French film has been 
evolving into something that is seen as having a negative 
effect on the cultural upbringing of French citizens.  For 
over a decade the prominent trend in the audiovisual sector 
has been toward a more American form of creation or product. 
Television series are bought in bulk from the states, (the 
quintessential example being “Knots Landing” that sold 150 
episodes for $50,000 to France in 1987 (Hoskins, 1991)) and 
if not French imitations are introduced. Take for example 
the situation comedies “Premiers baissers” and “les 
nouvelles filles d’à coté”. Premiers baissers’ striking 
resemblance to the hit American series “Saved by the Bell” 
would not be lost on the most ignorant boobtuber. Films too 
are seen to follow a Hollywood format that is unacceptable 
to the cultural authorities of France (see below).   
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Paradoxically, to an amateur economist, the audiovisual 
industry while not garnering the desired political or 
cultural results, is possibly becoming more economically 
viable due the change toward more pop-culture (and allegedly 
low or base culture) rather than high-culture determined 
production. French film producers more and more frequently 
opt for remakes or popular comedy for French viewers or 
Hollywood blockbusters destined for international markets 
for example “Jeanne d’Arc, “The Fifth Element” and “The 
Ninth Gate” (Messerlin 2002: 18).  In order to cope with 
this change and restore social rather than economic 
benefits, as preferred by the cultural elite, France 
implements, both national and regional policies in hopes 
that a reverse in the trend toward Americanized, big budget, 
blockbusters will appear.   
 
In this paper I argue that the trade related 
audiovisual policies France has implemented on both national 
and regional levels have not achieved national goals to 
their expected extent. Futhermore I argue that the policies 
France has implemented with the European Union or singulary 
have in fact had secondary effects, letting in more foreign 
cultural influences and stifling what the Ministry of 
Culture had hoped for the French cinematic arts. To support 
this I will address the following topics: the changing 
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 cultural situation, regional trade blocs and the danger of 
shared competency to nationalist cultural policies, and 
recent data supporting a growing American audiovisual 
industry presence in France, resulting from the current 
audiovisula policies in force.  Added to the increased 
American presence I will also argue that anti-American based 
policies have created inroads for other, less dominant and 
perhaps less insidious, but culturally foreign values and 
ideals nonetheless.   
  
There is adequate evidence that the Cultural 
Institutions of France are facing severe pressure to change. 
The growing number of US films topping the charts in France 
is but one such piece of evidence. As these institutions are 
a product of history, the first section will look at the 
role of the past and path dependancy in situating France in 
such an uncomfortable place today facing what seems perhaps 
a “no way out” predicament for the institutions dealing with 
French culture, the Ministry of Culture, the state as a 
whole and the audiovisual producers. 
  
Because the past inevitably influences the present and 
future of French audiovisual policies, the culture and 
identity that has been built on centuries of living and 
trying to understand onesself plays an important, weighty 
and at times illogical role in dealing with other identities 
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 and cultures. For this reason our second section looks at 
international trade theory and trade reality and how French 
ideology plays a part in these two areas. 
  
My third section uses data from the European 
Audiovisual Observatory, the Motion Picture Association of 
America and other sources to find direct evidence of the 
cultural backfiring phenomena I argue are occurring in 
France. Using this data in conjunction with expert opinions 
expressed in journal articles and relevant literary works, I 
will try to support my claim that indeed the audiovisual 
trade polices France has entered into have undermined the 
national agenda and given ample reason for France to 
reevaluate cultural policy and trade related cultural 
policy.  
A discussion section will seek to explain the explicit 
goals of the Ministry of Culture. By evaluating secondary 
data we will see how these goals were not met, and how 
undesirable secondary effects were also created. The 
Discussion wraps up by creating an hierarchy of goals and 
revealing the implicit goals intended by a French elite 
using the aforementioned explicit goals.   
Concluding remarks will summarize the proceeding 
arguments and presented evidence and suggest new areas for 
exploration that may lead to more suitable policies given 
the actual goals.  
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CHAPTER II. 
CULTURE 
 
In France the role of the state can be very influential 
even (or especially) in the realm of culture.  The question 
of the role of culture as it affects current trade related 
cultural policies in France, begins with the creation of the 
Republic of France, and hence French citizens, following the 
Revolution of 1789. France has a strong tradition of state 
intervention going back hundreds of years (Loosely 2003: 
227)  The successful creation of modern France, it was 
believed, relied upon creating French citizens and a strong 
state apparatus.The concept of creating citizens is not 
unique, Italian minister Massimo d'Azeglio is quoted as 
having said “ having created Italy, all that remained was to 
create Italians”. More recently the question of the 
possibility of a European citizen has been posed by 
Habermas. Habermas, arguing in a very French-like way, 
favors an institutionalized type of identity formation 
(Habermas, 2001). However, for this work such questions will 
be left to those scholars who ponder such abstractions in 
depth.   
  
 A crucial element to French culture that cannot be 
forgone in understanding the trajectory of audiovisual 
policy is the relationship between the state and her 
citizens. Succinctly, the French state is given substantial 
powers to make policy with little interest group input. The 
statist model of governance, that France is known for, tends 
to be very centralized, lending the government tactical 
advantages by way of “institutional arrangements, 
organizational processes…a powerful executive… and a strong 
bureaucracy, legitimized by history and reinforced by 
culture (Schmidt, State to market, 1996).”   
  
From this arrangement it seems that the survivial of a 
system where government has a relatively free hand to make 
policy is predicated upon a culture that accepts their word 
as truth. The achilles heel evident to Schmidt (1996: 69) in 
this form of government is that when the “state cannot 
introduce new formulae, paralysis may set in, especially in 
foreign trade.” Has the French Elite been unable to develop 
an efficient audiovisual trade policy, thus giving rise to a 
deteriorating market for the artistic French film? This is 
very possibly the case.      
 
Once a cohesive identity had been satisfactorily 
established after the revolution of 1789 a strong sense of 
culture emerged as well, and in various disciplines, 
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 including the audiovisual arts; painting, music, literature 
and film. Many of the representations of these disciplines 
of art are claimed to be unique from other cultural 
representations in that they are a form of high culture. The 
belief in the importance and existence of high culture in 
France is still strongly adhered to today (Van Hemel 1996: 
68).  
 
In the late 20th century, after the creation of the 
Ministry of Culture in 1958, a sucession of French Ministers 
of culture have aimed to use the ministry’s mandate to 
proactively influence the political determination of the 
French people, in large part through teaching and availing 
French high cultural creations, actions which have lead to 
specific trade related conflicts. Ingrained into the french 
psyche, the cinematic arts are a sacred popular art also 
allowing the elite of France to prop up their proud feelings 
associated with the revolution (Daugnaud 2004: 10).       
 
CREATING THE REPUBLIC. 
 
The importance of the post revolution experience in 
France comes from the unbreakable link of language and 
identity. While this is not the major focus of this work, it 
is nevertheless important to note the unlimited power of 
language to represent the common link between people and to 
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 convey meaning and sway public opinion and aide in policy 
formation. This idea of using discourse to change policy 
direction is explored by Schmidt and others in theorizing EU 
policy formation (Schmidt 2002: 899,). And it is language’s 
presence within audio-visual cultural products that one can 
begin to see the potential need for protection of this 
effective policy determinant that the french so adamantly 
seek.   
 
After the overthrow of the monarchy, one of the tasks 
of the Jacobin inheritors was to create a Republic of French 
people.  The measures carried out to accomplish this 
attempted to standardize the daily habits of citizens across 
the country, in efforts of consolidation.  This 
standardization consisted of education systems, weights and 
measures and language.  The deep-set importance of language 
as a republican value is exemplified by Pierre Rosanvallon 
in his text L’etat en France de 1789 a nos jours, with this 
quote “Des 1790, on cherche par example a unifier la langue 
et a aneantir les patois”
1. (Rosanvallon, 1990).  Yet it was 
Abbe Gregoire who presented the unification of language as 
“la clef de la constitution d’une Republique une et 
indivisible”
2 (Certeau, 1975).  
 
                                                 
1
 Since 1790, we have been trying, for example, to unify language and eradicate dialects. 
2
 …the key to the one and only Republic. 
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 Even prior to the French Revolution, the Academie 
Francaise had been active in ensuring the purity of French 
since 1635. French is a language that saw its first text 
written in 842 and which replaced Latin in the ruling 
monarchy in 1539 (Academie Française). Therefore, the roots 
of french cultural dependency on language and, to a certain 
degree political regime, first took hold over one thousand 
years ago.    
Beginning with the Revolution and continuing during 
subsequent political regimes, the connection between 
language and culture took on a serious and proactive role in 
maintaining that which is French. While public discourse 
relayed to the people through speech or the written word may 
seem to be an obvious political tool, it was not until late 
1950’s that a ministry of culture would be created to 
harness the persuasiveness of language and discourse through 
the audiovisual arts. Before the Ministry of Culture existed 
the easily transmissible audiovisual messages were used by 
various ministries including the ministry of agriculture, 
who in 1912 used the film industry for professional 
recruiting purposes (Vernier 2004). 
 
Therefore the French political apparatus may have an 
alternative agenda for the Ministry of culture, ironically 
placing culture and art behind objectives of power and 
capacity to lead. This purported goal, no less sought by 
10 
 other nations, is in essence, to ensure the continuation of 
a French way of life, period. Beyond this simple 
pronouncement, the issue becomes impacted and compounded by 
the realities asserted from within, read national divisions, 
(eg. the political left or right, or pro EU or anti EU) 
beliefs and agendas of the population, and from outside, 
understood as international relations of uni, bi and multi-
lateral nature.  
 
 
HIGH CULTURE AND THE ART OF IDEALS 
 
There is a certain distinction made, between high/elite 
culture and low/mass culture.  High culture, that many would 
associate with Europe, is primarily based on the works from 
ancient or probably deceased creators.  At very least, high 
culture is certainly traditional.  This type of culture, “is 
that of Shakespeare or Bach and is an imperative for any 
making a claim to culture”, its transnational character 
unquestioned (Van Hemel 1996).   
  
Audiovisual culture as one component of high culture 
has played a role in French identity beginning in 1895 when 
the first motion picture was created in France.  Between 
1895 and the First World War, the art of filmmaking was 
born.  And it is truly in the spirit of art that film is 
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 considered. This aspect of creating a work of art out of 
film is perhaps more associated with the Films of Europe and 
France, where not only films but also television shows are, 
marked by their creators and directors and not by their 
celebrity actors or even theme, at least that is how it has 
been in the past (Hoskins and Mcfayden, 1991). Furthermore 
to Bernard Lamizet (1999) “[L]e cinema n’est pas un art 
neuf…Les films empruntent a la rhetorique et aux formes de 
representation qui appartiennent aux autres arts, par 
rapport auxquelles il se situe comme une forme d’extension, 
d’amelioration, plus que comme un art nouveau en rupture”.3  
It is from this concept of extension of art that perhaps the 
current audiovisual landscape is imbued with a strong sense 
of culture.  
  
As films (and television) now represent a growing force 
in audiovisual creations, one can understand the desire of 
the French state in hoping to control this influential 
arena. The international debate is forced to the fore, with 
different opinions falling on different sides of a more or 
less two sided field (Maule 2002: 2). The high culture of 
French filmmaking is ever challenged by more and greater 
free trade, but at what costs, economically and socially? 
 
                                                 
3
 Cinema is not a new art form…Films borrow rhetoric and representational structure belonging to other arts, to which 
they take on a role of extension and improvement rather than replacement and separation. 
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 The French authorities, namely the Ministries of 
Culture and Education present the question of audiovisual 
protection as a social issue, claiming that the artistic 
traditions and cultural heritage of France are what 
organically creates citizens who are politcally aware, 
socially responsible and global participants (Loosely 2003: 
230). Taking an opposing view John Baldock in his study of 
the effects of culture on the evolution of welfare state 
concludes by saying “[c]ulture is neither a likely cause nor 
a supportive context for the welfare state”(1999: 472). If 
Baldock is right then this incites deeper exploration into 
what the true reason for tight governmental control, through 
the use of the Ministry of Culture, truly is.  The evidence 
of state efforts to mold culture has most recently been 
supported by the French three pillared system of subsidies 
responsible for changing the cultural domain. Culture in the 
1980’s became something belonging to and inextricable from 
national industry, therefore, according to Dagnaud, 
stimulating national identity (2004:15).   
 
What is it that makes the French the way they are? And 
why do they oppose very perceivably American culture and 
values? The answer is not clear and one cannot wholly accuse 
the french of anti-American sentiment. Nevertheless, Sophie 
Munier’s article titled “Anti-Americanisms in France” 
provides us with seven sources of anti-American sentiment 
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 (2005). All may have merit, however, I have distinguished 
four that are of significant importance to our research 
topic.  
 
The first of Meunier’s sources I deem relevant to why 
France, through trade related cultural policy, wishes to 
keep American values out is: Legacy Anti-Americanism. This 
type builds up over decades if not centuries of relations. 
One such vivid legacy is that of American rhetoric and 
action toward Communist thought. Because much of the reason 
behind protecting audiovisual products is socially based, 
that which is contrary to Communist and leftist thought can 
be seen as contrary to the French social goals. Part of what 
the French hold dear is their commitment to ensuring and 
insuring the well-being of her citizens. America’s blatant 
anti-Communist posturing over the years has easily compiled 
a substantial stock of French anti-capitalism, anti-
imperialism and therefore anti-Americanism. 
 
Meunier’s second source of bearing, is Elitist Anti-
Americanism. Elitist Anti-Americanism presents a type of 
anti-Americanism beginning with the colonization of North 
America. The french saw the new colonies as uncultured, 
unhistoried, uneducated and undiscerning. What is 
significant to this type of anti-Americanism is that it used 
to reinforce a certain elite Frenchness, where to be french 
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 is to be opposite of (colonial) American. It must be said, 
however, that this is primarily an elite sentiment, and 
while there is a tradition of an elite ubiquity in the 
governing apparatus that attempts to provide the masses with 
an ideology, there is no doubt a discrepancy, proven not 
least by the attraction of the French populace to American 
films, shows and music.  
 
The third source I have borrowed from Meunier is 
Nostalgic Anti-Americanism. This Meunier distinguishes from 
the elite type inasmuch as it is shared by French of all 
walks of life, not soley the elite. French, harboring 
feelings of nostalgic anti-Americanism, feel that life was 
better before the American hegemony, before the unfortunate 
successes of Coca-Cola and McDonald’s. Meunier classifies 
this type as a defensive anti-americanism, one which “calls 
for protectionist actions [like] the “cultural exception”. 
(Meunier 2005: 134)”  
 
The last type I have identified from Meunier’s seven is 
Social Anti-Americanism. This type truly embodies why any 
conduit of American culture must be tightly controlled by 
the French government. It is based on the values that are 
present in America that are more of less wholly objected to 
by the French. The first value is inequality, evidenced by 
the large wage differential between the rich and the poor. 
15 
 The second value is violence and hypocrisy. Gun control is 
seen as poor and reflected in crime rates of major US 
cities. American multiculturalism goes against the French 
idea of assimilation, creating a sort of aculturation method 
divergence. The last value is overbearing religiosity that 
the more or less secular France finds over the top.  
 
It is really these values and ideas and past grievances 
presented through anti-Americanisms that the French 
government wishes to keep far from French minds. And it is 
not even that the French act oppositely to the values they 
dislike in America, rather these are values they would like 
to, but do not necessarily embody (Meunier 2005: 134)    
 
We turn now to the experience of the ministry of 
culture its rise to power after WWII and its many 
incarnations since its first Minister, André Malraux, 
minster from 1959 to 1969.    
 
THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE 
 
Before immediately addressing the Ministry of Culture, 
a brief description of the audiovisual controls existing 
before its establishment merits attention, giving historical 
proof of the evolution of the State’s role in the 
audiovisual sector. Before the invasion of Americanization, 
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 the French state found other justifications for keeping a 
hand on the joystick of the Audiovisual sector. One key 
element to the importance of the audiovisual sector in 
France is the fact that public support gives away more that 
480 million euros a years to French audiovisual productions 
in one form or another (EAO Yearbook 2006: 97)  
  
As films, such as they were called back in the day 
before “movies”, were only created in 1895 the state at 
first took little interest in the industry, its few needs 
managed by the Ministry of the Interior. Several mechanisms 
were set up in the 1920’s and 1930’s to coordinate between 
state and industry but to no real success until after the 
second world war (Vernier, 2004).   
  
The establishment of the Centre National de 
Cinématographie (CNC) marked the beginning of a durable 
institution, capable of managing the State-Industry 
relations. The CNC is the chief body responsible for any 
outside intervention or subsidies into the audiovisual 
sector. Of note, during the early years of the CNC, a 
proposed tax on foreign films of 25% of all receipts met 
with demise due to the nature of its intention. This law 
sought to use American films to pay for French projects. 
However, as a sort of prelude to the Blair House Accords, 
this proposal was turned down. The french traded this 
17 
 somewhat aggressive audiovisual policy for greater general 
support through relief from wartime debt in what was called 
the Blum-Byrnes agreement.  
 
The relatively youthful ministry established in 1958 
during a Gaullist period was first presided over by André 
Malraux, also a Gaullist, whose mission during his ten year 
tenure, consisted of democratizing the arts, that of 
bringing the arts to the people. The creation of the 
Ministry sent a message to the people, that Film, once under 
the authority of the ministry of industry, was more than 
just an economic sector, (Vernier, 2004). The ministry was 
an agglomeration of many previously diverse areas of 
competency. Therefore its cobbled structure put into 
question its true mission and authority.   
 
In his time, Malreaux, stubbornly believed that while 
his goal of democratization merited attention, placing the 
arts into some form of education system was unneccesary, 
asserting that “great art spoke for itself and needed no 
mediation or cultural capital” (Loosely 2003: 228). An 
initial measure set in motion by Malraux in 1959 signifying 
the dominance of art over industry in the audiovisual sector 
was the advance on receipts fund. This fund allowed for 
financing movies based on their ability to pay back the loan 
from CNC funds collected at the time from a seat tax on 
18 
 every ticket sold. So while the audiovisual sector became 
the child of a culturally minded master, the monetary 
support depended upon a jury’s decision of economic 
viability. Malraux’s policy of state intervention followed a 
shift of funds allocation from the early 1950’s, in which 
the “loi d’aide temporaire de 1948” for film projects became 
the “fonds de développement à l’industrie 
cinématographique”. With the shift, came the conditions 
necessary for funding, namely the quality of the films and 
their moral and cultural content (Vernier, 2004).  The 
implications of these conditions is readily seen as trying 
to circumscribe what is art and what is not. This is an 
impossible task as art, to a great many is that which pushes 
the boundaries of the mind. Art is the imagination set free 
to create in a multidimesional space, that which has never 
been conceived of previously. This debate showed itself in 
France through “l’affaire Langlois”, named for the president 
of the CNC during the late 60’s. In a battle for control 
over cinematic arts, Langlois a champion of the true 
artform, remained in office allowing only minor forays by 
the Ministry of Culture into the politicizing of the 
Audiovisual arts during the end of Malraux’s tenure 
(Vernier, 2004).     
  
The strange evolution of the system of subsidies and 
the creation of a Minstry devoted entirely to Cultural 
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 affairs holds an altogether separate debate within France 
itself of minor weight, but of possible interest, to our 
subject. The film community understandably,  regarded the 
State as the enemy. The State took away freedom of 
expression and made film art beholden to a higher power, 
although, as we have seen only slightly during the first 
minister of culture’s attempt. From the standpoint of the 
question this paper raises, it is the Ministry of Culture 
who is the defender of the art of film from outside 
influences, (mostly American), as we have seen previously in 
our section on anti-Americanism.  The protection and 
promotion of high culture art hanging in the balance.     
  
The second great figure in the ministry of culture was 
the glamourous Jack Lang, also influential due to the length 
of his tenure 1981-1986 and 1988-1993. As a member of the 
Socialist Party Lang’s policies were steeped in the 
purported ability of film to perpetuate a culture of 
socially conscious citizens. While both major political 
parties in France believe in the strength of film as a means 
of discourse, it is the socialist party that has 
predominantly believed in a cinematic tradition favoring the 
left.   
 
Lang set an ostensibly different tone for the fate of 
art and culture in France. Inside the international debate 
20 
 over the place of culture in trade politics, existed a sub 
debate over the definition of art. While this debate is no 
less important, its bearing on the trade related cultural 
polices capable of stirring up international opposition are 
of lesser importance. This secondary debate grew largely out 
of Minister Lang’s attempt to recapture the arts by 
including non-standard areas of activity like production of 
the arts, graffiti and modern music like rap and rock. His 
unorthodox policies received criticism from both major 
political parties (Loosely 2003: 228).   
 
The Policies of the Lang Ministry, pointedly relevant 
to our question of French cultural policies affects on 
international trade disputes and negotiations are the 
various state interventions into cultural creations. A 
reprise of the Ministry of Culture to place its hands firmly 
around the politics of audiovisual culture took shape under 
Lang’s rule, portraying at least one similarity shared by 
the left and the right, that state control still reigned 
supreme in terms of providing for the people.  
 
Minister Lang’s approach had two major objectives: “On 
the one hand, it aim[ed] to preserve national cultural 
independence, unity and prestige” (Guerrieri, 2005).  The 
idea behind this objective was create French films that 
could attract much larger audiences than in the past, making 
21 
 them more compatible with worldwide liberalizing trade. 
Lang’s goal here would seem hard to achieve if in fact the 
films they produce are shown only in French one of the 
strict criteria to be met for fund eligibility. The nature 
of how films or movies  work (image plus sound) would 
preclude the continued success of his new film style. Even 
with the quality of dubbing and subtitles, to consistantly 
ask foreign viewers to view films in version française would 
be too much. Especially, as at least the US film market 
shows, viewers are very reluctant to bother seeing films 
that are subtitled or dubbed, or even films using british 
accents (Hoskins and McFayden 1991).     
 
The second part of the Lang Plan sought to increase the 
cultural diversity of the films being produced by the 
French.  This meant supporting films that sought to be 
different and daring, as well as feature films. Yet, the 
nature of the films still needed to pass the judges panel in 
order to be eligible for the healthy subsidies handed out by 
the state. The plan also encouraged first production teams 
as a way to train new artists in the field. Both aims of the 
Lang plan were to be acheived through a cumbersome and 
complex system of subsidies, quotas, and with Langs return 
to power as minister of education through bringing heritage, 
film and theatre options for the baccalaureat (Loosely 2003: 
229).  
22 
  
Minister Lang used the term ‘cultural diversity’ also 
appearing in the wording of the Television Without Frontiers 
Directive (TWF). As is frequently the case, interpretation 
is everything. The cultural diversity Lang spoke of stirs up 
images of French cultural diversity or at least this is 
implied. The TWF Directive too calls for cultural diversity, 
but in what way? It would seem that to the French promoting 
cultural diversity within the EU means France using the TWF 
to make as much French productions and likewise other member 
nations should do the same, rather than promoting a more 
homogenous diversity (an unlikely coupling) that sees 
multinational cultural productions arising throughout all 
countries party to the EU.  
 
The lang plan bolstered the three pillared system that 
had taken some form prior to his arrival. The first pillar 
of state intervention redoubled in 1986 was the “Support 
Fund” or Compte de soutien a l’industrie de programs 
(COSIP). This COSIP pillar is paid for primarily by the 
Televsion industry, contributing 68% of the total fund (181 
million euros in 2005(CNC 2006). It should be noted that the 
fund grants 78% of total outflow automatically without 
calling into questions the cultural relevance of the 
project. The other quarter (32 million euros in 2005 (CNC 
23 
 2006)) is subject to the jury or film industry experts (this 
is also known as the third pillar), (Dagnaud 2004: 12).   
 
The second common interest previous three pillars and 
the Lang plan is the famous quota system that has plagued 
viewers and programmers alike. Viewers because they are not 
free to watch whatever they like and programmers because 
they lack for quality programs able to fill the time slots.  
Now replaced by the European version of the quota system 
(under the TWF directive) based heavily on the French model 
the system allows for a minimum of European works to be 
shown during certain prime viewing times, not including, 
sporting events, teletext services, teleshopping, and game 
shows (European Institute for the Media 2001).  
 
The third pillar is the independent production pillar 
aimed very much at Lang’s second goal of increasing the 
diversity of audiovisual productions. Taking on greater 
shape late in Lang’s tenure, the independent projects un-
linked with a television station should consume a full two 
thirds of the investment of this type. In France many times 
audiovisual creations are created for specific television 
stations, therefore those projects not linked may have 
trouble finding support without a gauranteed outlet for the 
final product, hence the need for this sort of support in 
France. On top of the two thirds funding ear-marked for un-
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 linked projects, three quarters of the funds must be 
allotted to cinematic films.  
 
The baccalaureat level heritage, film and theatre 
options devised by Lang ended up being scrapped but the 
quotas and subsidies survived within the three pillard 
system.  This brings up questions of the real motives of the 
policies; are they to produce good citizens as culture 
ministers have pronounced or are they merely instruments to 
protect an inefficient industry or perhaps a reinfantilized 
industry? (Obviously, as France began the filmmaking field 
in the late 1800’s this cannot be an infant industry, 
however its possible longlasting stagnation may have, as I 
name it, reinfantilized the field). However helpful it would 
be to have an answer to these questions, knowing the ideas 
behind the realities won’t bring us any closer to making any 
concrete predictions or suggestions for the future.  
 
The strong state structure in France emergent from post 
revolutionary methods of nation building continues to drive 
creativity and culture. This strange dynamic with an almost 
Catch-22 personality, is difficult to grasp. The people 
create. What they create they call art. Without a doubt, 
what they create has been influenced by their surroundings, 
environment and education, even politics. Even before the 
state intervened into the business of defining art, its very 
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 existence seeped into art throughout history, inadvertently. 
Only as the State made serious attempts to use the 
audiovisual sector for political purposes did those creating 
the art become aware of the incredible influence the State 
had in guiding their productions.  
 
With the attachment of the powerful elite to culture 
and its ability to send messages, the relatively new 
Ministry of Culture has grown to possess great deal of 
power. It has been suggested that the Ministry is fully 
interested in creating discerning cultural citizens, thus 
weening them from base entertainment provided initially from 
abroad (but appearing more and more from within) (Van Hemel, 
1996). This started with the introduction of educational 
programs and was supported by the subsidy system that 
created a sort of civic responsibility understood to be part 
and parcel of recieving government funds. Many certainly 
would question the freedom to create and break new grounds 
and make bold statements under such a system. 
 
What has essentially happened in France is an organic 
and natural policy development over many years. Much like 
viewing Paris from above, audiovisual policy resembles a 
piecemeal contruction, based not on distant forsight, but 
ideals that carried the day, indeed a very reactionary 
developmental process. Included in the factors that led to 
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 the various policies created at various times are Post 
revolution citizen building actions, France’s ensuing claim 
that art, and in particular audiovisual art are cultural 
creations existing on a higher level than other forms of 
culture, various anti-Americanisms developed over the years, 
and the recent realization by the State of the power of 
audiovisual creations to continue an approved elite idealogy 
and way of life.       
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Chapter III. 
TRADE THEORIES AND REALITIES 
  
Until now I have almost exclusively dealt with France 
and the audiovisual question. But France is no longer 
beholden unto itself alone. The following section will start 
to address France’s plight within the framework of the 
European Union.The trouble with addressing any issue that 
exists in the realm of the European Union is that so many 
policies are interconnected and interdependent on a 
multitude of levels. In reality, it is therefore hard to 
look at the theories of trade in audiovisual creations 
without considering the affects it may have on other 
sectors. For instance, during the trade negotiations that 
took place in Punta del Este Uruguay, many sectors were 
covered and trade-offs were made. In this case, Agriculture 
was seen to have been somewhat compromised in favor of the 
United states and other free market proponents so that the 
audiovisual sector could secure a ten year exception to 
opening markets (Paugam 2006). However hard it may be, 
addressing the messy subject of European factors in the 
French Audiovisual question is what we will need to do in 
 order to see how trade theories have impacted the 
audiovisual sector in recent years. 
 
1. THEORIES 
 
Countries trade because it is in their best interest. 
The concept is very basic in terms of economic thought; 
through the specialization of tasks each country does what 
it does best and all involved can make a gain, economically. 
Since WWII the international trade between countries 
including the United States and France and many other 
European countries has been conducted under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) emerging in 1946. The 
GATT is governed by regularly convening participating 
members in “Rounds”. The last and most important round 
bearing on the audiovisual sector was the Uruguay round. 
This final GATT round grouped GATT and the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) under one World Trade 
Organizaion (WTO) under which all subsequent rounds are 
held.  Prior to the creation of the WTO however the GATT 
worked to ensure that through a secure and predictable 
trading environment positive gains from trade (income 
levels, employment and efficiency) could be realized 
(Sampson 2001: 13).  The major priniciple by which this body 
regulated trade was the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
priniciple.  This basic principle asks that any treatment 
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 afforded one nation in trade related matters be afforded all 
nations adherent to the GATT.  
  The general free trade argument, one also held by the 
GATT was that only for moral, health or environmental 
reasons could member countries exclude products or processes 
from the free trade market (Dunkley 2000: 70).  Social, 
economic and cultural interests were not the responsibility 
of the GATT. Instead, policies  within each area of 
competency are where these non-economic matters should look 
for protection or support. Not surprisingly, as we have 
briefly alluded to above, the interconnectedness of policy 
domains and cultural baggage frequently find their way into 
trade related matters, making the assumption that non-trade 
policies can effectively protect non-trade sectors rather 
weak (Dunkley 2000: 126).  
 Concurrently with the post WWII free trade phenomenon, 
the European Union too began to gain greater and greater 
policy competency. Under the European Community Article 113 
trade policy has been a shared competency policy domain 
since the Rome treaty of 1957 (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1998: 
2). This makes trade one of the oldest regional policy areas 
within the EU. However, unlike free trade the European Union 
engages is a different type of trade regime that at times 
conflicts with prior of current negotiated agreements under 
the WTO, a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA).        
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 A.  REGIONAL TRADE THEORY 
 
Once the natural and almost essential decision to 
engage in trade outside national boundaries is made, for 
France there are two options. Bilateral agreements are not 
really available as we have learned that extra-EU trade is 
negotiated singularly. However, inside the EU is another 
matter. This regional trade scenario complicates the overall 
picture of trade in audiovisual products.  Nations that are 
supposedly sovereign unto themselves only act so (in trade 
matters) within the EU. That is to say that the trade that 
goes on between one EU member country and another is subject 
to different regulations than trade between an EU country 
and a third party nation. 
 Regional trade agreements (RTAs), like the EU, are 
contrary to the priniciples laid out in the WTO, those of 
MFN etc. They allow those party to the RTA to support each 
other while protecting against those outside. Some of the 
explicit advantages of an RTA are better economies of scale 
improved security, controlled migration, political stability 
and market regulation, (Murphy 1990: 80) internally and 
increased bargaining power externally (Dunkley 2000: 79).  
But those positive effects are only sensed by the members 
party to the agreement, hence the strong opposition from 
countries outside the EU and party to the WTO.  
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  The gains for a member upon entering an RTA are not 
guaranteed by any means and can be dependent on: comparitive 
advantages relative to other member countries, barriers 
created against outside nations, openness to new members and 
demand for goods from countries outside the group (Dunkley 
2000: 81). All these factors can play a part when EU 
countries decide how to present their national position at 
the ratification stage of trade policy. As we will see 
further on, the variables above played out in such a way 
that Europe with a strong France at the lead decided that as 
a regional trading group they were better off, holding back 
greater liberalization as evidenced by both the results of 
the Uruguay round of the GATT and the implementation of the 
Television Without Frontiers directive.    
  
An RTA does not by rule need to be an anti-free trade 
bloc. Only if the RTA has a trade diversion effect does the 
agreement take on a negative light. This odd form of 
autarky, renders industries within the RTA inefficient and 
propped up by false legs. On the other hand, at times RTA’s 
have introduced greater liberalization than would have 
occurred without the agreement. Some argue that in certain 
trade sectors, the EU RTA brought on greater liberalization 
at a faster rate catching some of the countries unaware, and 
perhaps leading to the redoubled efforts to halt the spread 
of free trade during the Uruguay round (Sampson 2001: 13). 
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Despite the opposition to RTA’s there are more and more 
of them popping up, not all of the same magnitude of the EU, 
but regional agreements nonetheless. Since 1992, 28 new 
agreements have been reported begging the question of the 
future of international trade dynamics (Sampson 2001: 14).  
    
 
B. INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY 
 
France as a member of the EU has national goals and 
national methods to achieve those goals.  As a nation three 
features are significant in understanding French trade 
policy. The first feature is that the President of the 
Republic of France is pre-eminent in trade related issues, 
second, a trade minister runs a highly specialized decision-
making process and the prime minister clears French 
positions  on EU policies, leaving the parliament involvment 
diminished (Paugam 2006). The evidence of the statist model 
of government is present in international affairs just as it 
is in national affairs. Additionally, the national affair 
issues associated with a country are increasingly shaped by 
international issues. The inverse cannot be so easily said, 
as the sheer size of what is considered international easily 
overshadows that which can be considered national.     
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 On the EU level, France is restricted in voicing its 
national agenda as its positions are voiced through the EU 
Council of Ministers.  In truth, to say that France’s trade 
interests are spoken with one voice is naïve. While that may 
be true of the negotiation stage of trade policy, when it 
comes to ratification of the terms negotiated are a whole, 
national interests from all EU members can make their voices 
heard (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1998).  Futhermore when 
deciding how to voice national positions, members of the EU 
will make alliances with other member nations along either 
economic and therefore greater liberalization dimension, or 
along an ideological dimension, dependent on individual 
member attitude toward sovereignty and its trust in the 
commission (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1998: 6).  As we can see, 
the case of Audiovisual trade splits these dimensions 
neatly. The side on which the common position fell is 
squarely on the ideological side overtly, France and Europe 
deciding it best to negotiate a protectionist policy rather 
than free market ideology in order to achieve French 
national goals of protecting an audiovisual industry 
capable, in the eyes of the elite, of swaying public opinion 
and instilling a solid sense of Frenchness in her citizens. 
     
  
2. REALITIES 
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 The audiovisual debate in question concerns only one 
aspect of the larger problem as seen by the French 
Government. (Generalizing that all members of the French 
Government are all of one mind on this issue certainly 
cannot be true. Despite that fact, the overwhelming need to 
protect culture from outside influence is undeniable.  The 
larger debate posing nearly philosophical questions relating 
to identity, social determinism and language is too unwieldy 
to be addressed as one topic of research. It is for this 
reason that this work looks only at culture through the lens 
of audiovisual productions, heavily based on film. That 
definition of culture is then analysed for its implication 
on trade and vice versa.  
  
The major trade related aspects relevant to the 
question of culture begin with the insistence of a “Cultural 
Exception” during trade negotiations under GATT/WTO. Because 
the real debates begin during this era of intensifying 
globalization it sets the tone for years to come indeed 
still influencing policy decisions taken today. Having seen 
partially the face of French culture presented in section 
II, this section on trade will describe the actions taken by 
France since the mid 1990’s to ensure the healthy survival 
of at very least French culture. In particular, trade 
related cultural policies, such as quotas for foreign films 
and other audiovisual productions will be addressed as will 
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 subsidies creating an unfair advantage for domestic 
producers, some of which we have already seen.  
 
These policies were introduced first in France. But as 
the attraction of being able to negotiate as peers with the 
US and other trading heavies, France looked more and more to 
using this avenue of protection, what the French or 
Europeans would call assistance to fledgling 
industries.(This in itself gives some reason to doubt the 
ideological foundations of protectionism for societal gains. 
Is it a fledgling industry that needs to be supported until 
it can become viable on its own or is it a cost to be 
accepted for its ability to instill values allegedly valued 
above money and the bottom line?) In addition to looking at 
French audiovisual policies it also is imperative that EU 
wide policies pertaining to Audiovisual creations and trade 
are addressed. This European dimension has two fronts the 
internal policies like the Television Without Frontiers 
(TWF) directive and the external front uniting Europe behind 
a regional shield or RTA, facing the worlds markets.  
 
The usefulness of these assessments will largely assist 
our search for the true outcomes the successive policies 
France and France with allies uses to protect their 
culture(s).  
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 A. FRANCE AND REGIONAL TRADE REALITIES 
 
The truth behind the regional trade in audiovisual 
products in France and its regional partners is a story very 
much written by the French.  Internal policies governing the 
sector are in the form of directives, and one directive in 
particular the Television Without Frontiers (TWF) directive 
issued on the third of October, 1989 as directive 
89/552/EEC.  
  
The TWF, as stated in the official summary issued by 
the EU, is “to ensure the free movement of broadcasting 
services within the internal market and at the same time to 
preserve certain public interest objectives, such as 
cultural diversity, the right of reply…” (Television 
Broadcasting Activities). To achieve these multiple goals 
the Directive requires EU member countries to reserve a 
majority of transmission time for European works. In 
addition, 10% of transmission time must be reserved for 
European works with independent producers. The idea lying 
behind these quotas is that by forcing EU member countries 
to show european works throughout the Union, European 
television services will flourish economically and 
culturally. One can see the French cultural rhetoric coming 
through, as the TWF also has special responsibilities toward 
independent producers.  
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The Directive very much a French project, and in line 
with many aspects of French Audiovisual policy at the time 
of the directive’s initiation, however, is fought against by 
French repesentatives to the EU (Cocq and Messerlin 2003: 
4). It is therefore not surprising to note that France 
despite its insistance upon this directive, has by far one 
of the poorest implementation records (Mills 2006). 
  
The written goals are therfore not being reached, and 
small wonder, when an important and inspirational member 
country in terms of the TWF directive is itself only half-
hearted. Pan-European channels represent fewer than 12% of 
the total channels and less than 0.7% of revenues (Cocq 
Messerlin 2003: 4).  Perhaps an even more recognizable proof 
is taking a look at the television in France. Not 
surprisingly, at any given time on the basic television 
stations in France you see, French television programs and 
American television programs, not the diversity intended by 
this directive.   
  
The quotas mentioned before, act as a shield from non- 
EU countries. This is widely interpreted as a shield from 
the US. If there is just no time for the value corrupt 
programs from the US to be shown than people will just have 
to watch what else is offered, or so the rationale goes.  
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   B. FRANCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE REALITIES. 
 
France is one of the founding members of the European 
Union and thus carries a strong voice in international 
trade. France is the fifth largest exporting country in the 
world behind Germany, the United States, Japan and China 
(http://www.exporter.gouv.fr/exporter/Pages.aspx?iddoc= 
669&pex=1-2-41-233-669). However, since the Treaty of Rome, 
signed in 1957, all aspects of international trade, trade 
negotiations and enforcement, of those members adherent to 
the treaty, have been under the sole authority of the 
supranational powers.  
 
The motivation behind this agent-priniciple 
relationship was at the time, insulating policies from 
domestic pressure groups and increased influence through 
cooperation (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1998: 2).  From a 
general standpoint on trade it would seem that France has 
lost control over commercial policies, however, any 
negotiated agreements concluded at the supranational-
international level must then be approved by the European 
Council made up of national representatives from each member 
nation’s Ministry of Trade. In this respect France still 
reserves some veto power.  
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 This system of supranational competencies in trade 
related matters worked for several decades after the signing 
of the Treaty of Rome. While the audiovisual issues on the 
table during the beginning of  the GATT negotiations at 
Punta del Este Uruguay were of minor interest to the EU 
countries, by its finale in 1993, France and other countries 
began to question the compatibility of this type of policy 
formation with national strategies(Meunier and  Nicolaidis 
1998)(Europe had issues of interorganization to deal with at 
that time (Dunkley 2000: 45). 
 
In this round was born the “Cultural Exception” clause 
to trade, supported heavily by France and the EU.  The 
history of Cultural Exceptionism goes back to the post WWII 
years, but the idea really came to force during the Uruguay 
round and more specifically its conclusion with the Blair-
House Accords.  
 
The Uruguay round of negotiation under the auspices of 
the GATT was a defining moment, especially for France, and 
in more ways than possibly expected. Leading up to the 
round, protectionism had been growing in the worlds largest 
trading nations and the call for major GATT players to 
convene was dubbed as a necessary action to halt and reverse 
protectionism (Dunkley 2000: 46). The important results of 
the Uruguay Round bearing on the French trade related 
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 cultural policies were both explicit, in the form of the 
negotiated Blair House accords, and implicit in creation of 
the umbrella World Trade Organization that would oversee 
GATT agreements, General Agreements on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and dispute resolution (WTO website) and the 
continuing impetus for greater regional policies.   
 
“The Blair House Accords” is the name given to the 
agreement between the EU with a disproportionate weight 
given to France, and the United States concluding the 
Uruguay negotiations involving agriculture and audiovisual 
culture. In effect, France was holding up the completion of 
the Uruguay round due to the pressure of a strong farm lobby 
who would not have their sector of farming undercut by 
foreign imports. Hanging in the balance was the audiovisual 
sector, a much prized and valuable export of the United 
States as succeeding evidence will reveal.  The resut of 
this part of the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO negotiations was 
a redoubled effort of the European Audiovisual industry to 
ensure their creations were not compromised for the good of 
a small farm lobby. The efforts paid off and agriculture was 
opened up to freer trade and in exchange vague language 
allowing France and EU to continue to support heavily their 
audiovisual industry was used in the final agreement 
(Depetris thesis).   
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 This event is a good example of the the complexities of 
negotiating in the EU. Not only are the agendas of multiple 
nations involved, even on a national level interests can at 
times be so strong that a small French farm lobby can 
(almost) carry the day alone.  
 
Herein is the essence of the difficulty of the agent 
prinicipal relationship of the EU. How can France accomplish 
its goals when they are so very different than the goals of 
other “equal” partners? To some extent it cannot, and this 
is part of what I am trying to express with this paper. This 
point is somewhat explained by Harry Johnson who opined that  
 
one of the main themes that international economics has to teach 
about international relations is that most of the beliefs that motivate 
national policies are irrational, most of the alleged facts are not 
facts and most of the alleged lessons of experience are the result of 
igonorance or falsification of the actual facts of experience (Messerlin 
1996: 399).    
 
By entering into the EU and allowing many competencies 
to be shared among different soveriegn powers and distinct 
cultures, achieving national controle of culture becomes 
impossible. American influence through film and culture is 
not the only devil at the door. France’s complicit 
involvement with the EU and its potential benefits have 
weakened, and will continue to weaken, French Audiovisual 
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 Policy’s ability to achieve its goals of instilling French 
values important for continuing a French way of life.  
 
Over the past sixty years, the countries of the 
European Union have increasingly grouped their power as well 
as shared their authority, especially in terms of trade, 
with the hopes of making a better life for all Europeans. 
Much of the impetus for this principal-agent arrangement is 
due to increased globalization. This is general, I admit. 
But in search of that goal, shared competency too, has had 
dramatic effects on the outcomes of trade related 
audiovisual policies effective in France and the EU as a 
whole. The results of the policies created, that I label as 
ineffective, are evidenced by the following section.  
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
  
 
 
Chapter IV. 
EVIDENCE 
  
The evidence section of this paper takes an in depth 
look at the numbers statistics and accounting related to the 
international Audiovisual sector.  These hard facts will 
allow me to prove that initial assertion that French 
national policies and policies initiated or adhered to by 
France on a regional or international level have been 
detrimental to the French national agenda for its Cultural 
industries and secondary goals. The research will focus on 
French and European statistics and therefore much of the 
information will be derived from the European Audiovisual 
Observatory (EAO), an observatory body created by the 
Council of Europe and located in Strasbourg France. Other 
sources for this information will come from the American 
organization, the Motion Picture Association of America.  
 To best set the scene for the results the trade related 
cultural policies have had on France, I will lead off with a 
picture of the International film markets which will serve 
as an adequate proxy for the US Market seeing, as the 
statistics show, that the US makes up the bulk of the Films 
viewed abroad and the receipts taken in from those films. 
 This first section reveales the presence of American films 
in Europe and around the world and will provide ample 
evidence spurring the belief of many French and others 
(Canadians mostly) that their culture is under siege. 
 Most of the statistics compiled by the EAO assess the 
world of feature films, including documentaries, therefore 
short films and other audiovisual productions will not be 
considered. I will try to limit the amount of statistics 
presented and concentrate on Europe and France. European 
statistics will be limited to the twenty-five countries who 
are members of the EU since May, 2004.  
  
1. INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS 
Since the year 2000 the world has shown an increase in 
Box Office receipts from 15.92 billion to a total of 23.24 
billion in 2005, proving the fact that to many in the world 
feature films are indeed an industry and one with great 
profit potential (MPAA). The top five films according to box 
office revenues were in order of profitability, Harry Potter 
and the Goblet of Fire, Star Wars III: Revenge of the Sith, 
War of the Worlds, Madagascar and Mr and Mrs. Smith. All of 
these are either American productions or co-productions as 
is the case with Harry Potter (MPAA).  Admission into 
theatres in 2005 topped out at 7.45 billion of which 892 
million were Europeans and 1.4 billion were Americans, 
shedding some light on the ability of the American market to 
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 recoup much of its costs at home (MPAA) (despite the fact 
that with the entry of ten new member states in May of 2004, 
Europe now has 457.2 million inhabitants and the US only 295 
million). This overview shows the importance of the 
audiovisual sector in terms of economics and viewership, an 
important element in using audiovisual creations as 
political discourse.  
 
2. FRENCH STATISTICS 
 
A. FILM 
 
France has increased the total production in films from 
125 in 1997 to 187 in 2005, whereas the US once producing 
767 films in 1997, in 2005 only offers up 699 despite an 
upward trend.  These statistics can be somewhat misleading 
as the amount of films produced is not necessarily a 
reliable indicator of revenues. Of the 187 films made in 
France 5 made it to the top twenty films based on admission, 
of the fifteen remaining films all but one were US 
productions or US co-productions. The average film in France 
cost 6.2 million dollars to make whereas the average US film 
cost 60.0 million dollars (Focus 2006).   
 France in 2005 contributed 203 feature films(some not 
officially recognized accounting for the 16 film 
discrepancy, likewise for the following 181 statistic) up 
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 from 181 in 1999. These films were viewed on the more that 
5000 screens in France, the largest amount in all of Europe, 
supporting France’s role as a Film powerhouse. In 2005 the 
admissions into french cinemas totalled 175 million a 
decrease in seven years of 10%. Interesting to note that the 
US percentage fell in the same period by 2.4% (EAO focus). 
France has seen a growth in films produced and in box office 
grosses. The total receipts for France in 2004 totalled 1.1 
billion showing an increase of 13% while the US took in 7.7 
billion equalling a drop of 7.5% (EAO Yearbook). 
An important number to note in trying to see the 
weakness of French audiovisual policy is the market share 
according to country. In France US market share equalled 47% 
in 2004 while French market share only 36% and rising. So 
despite selling more tickets over successive years, France’s 
homegrown creations are still not attracting people like 
American imports (EAO yearbook). This aspect too has a 
sublty that needs to be qualified. While the French films 
seem to be gaining in popularity, it is the reason why that 
needs to be determined. As I will argue later in the 
discussion section french films are increasingly popular not 
for their cultural values eagerly sought by the average 
citizen but for their ability to mimick the pop culture 
formula used by Hollywood to attract mass audiences and not 
the art film lover.  
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 National public funding for French films in 2004 
equalled 482 million Euros quite a sum considering that the 
next nearest European country in terms of support was 
Germany with only 111 million. The United states figures for 
public subsidy are negligable in comparaison.     
A major change in the French Film landscape is the 
amount of 100% national films and the percent of co-
productions. There is a increase of both majority and 
minority co-productions and a decrease in the amount of 
national films (focus 2006). Co-productions are yet another 
fashion by which culture is passed into french society from 
abroad. 
 
B. TELEVISION 
 
On the television front, the situation is slightly 
different. The major policy affecting this industry is the 
Television Without Frontiers Directive. This directive has 
imposed quotas for European works to be shown on televisions 
throughout the EU, a protective measure, as this policy 
forbids an open market for television programmers, who might 
schedule programs from other countries driven by market 
forces were this policy not in place. Matter-of-factly, this 
policy has limited American programming on the television to 
a maximum of 40%. By these standards it may seem that the 
TWF policy has been effective in retaining control over 
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 French culture, by limiting the Americanization effects on 
television. However, two facts counter this initial belief; 
1) French shows have become Americanized thus allowing 
outside influence in through other channels and 2) France in 
finally complying with the TWF directive agreed to the 
multicultural basis on which the directive is founded.   
 
The above listed statistics point out the size and 
importance of the audiovisual market. The US still reigns 
supreme in terms of worldwide distribution, including in 
countries such as France. While there has been growth in the 
film sector in France the reasons behind the growth have not 
been driven by trade related cultural policies or 
accomplished the state’s goals for national audiovisual 
productions. Increased americanization of French television 
shows and the multicultural goals of the TWF directive have 
pushed France even farther from its desired goal of 
retaining a national identity. The following discussion will 
attempt to explain why the Film and Television policies 
undertaken by France may seem successful on some levels, but 
when analysed deeper, reveal inefficient reactionary 
policies, causing more damage then good to the understood 
national goals.  
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Chapter V. 
DISCUSSION 
  
The story behind the present laws affecting trade 
related cultural policies appears like any story may, with a 
beginning a middle and an end. The beginning to my work 
presented the history of France and the culture it 
engendered as one strong determinant of the relevant 
policies made today. Following the evolution of culture, 
France experienced external factors deriving from both its 
European partners within the EU and from influences further 
afield, for example the United States. The combination of 
the culture traditions of France mixed with external forces 
demanding change caused France to implement trade related 
cultural policies as a matter of reaction rather than 
proaction.  
  
 In the introduction I claimed that the policies 
implemented by France alone or with its regional trade 
partners in the EU poorly coped with the increasing presence 
of foreign and especially American cultural products. 
Furthermore I suggested that some of the policies not only 
 
 did not effectively achieve their goal, but worsened the 
situation instead. 
 
 It is my belief that the inefficient policies were the 
result of hidden goals masked by the stated obejectives of 
the competent state bodies. This can be best expressed by a 
type of hierarchy of goals, some explicit and others 
remaining unspoken.     
  
Importance 
of Objective 
Percieved Objective 
High 
Elite Protection of Elite Ruling Abilities 
Perpetuating Elite Lifestyle 
Medium High 
Protection of audiovisual industry (Prestige 
and Financial Benefits) 
Medium Low 
Protected French Cultural Values 
Low 
Protection of Cultural Diversity 
Table 1. 
 
In our table I have outlined the levels this research 
has uncovered. The importance of each objective is seen 
through those who make the policies or the elite (Schmidt, 
From state to…). With each step up the ladder we can also 
decrease the population that gains from the new higher 
objective.  
  
 Because French political elite may be unwilling to 
speak aloud their desire to continue their tradition of 
hands off policy making for their own benefit lower 
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 objectives are explicity disclosed, for example cultural 
diversity. This has become almost a buzz word in France from 
WTO negotiations to TWF policy foundations. It is impossible 
today to consult the French Ministry of Culture and 
Communication website without constantly coming across 
applause for this new way of protecting (French) culture. I 
do not disagree with the protection of diversity of culture, 
but using it for another end creates not only distrust but 
as we see, bad policies. 
 
So perhaps because the higher levels of objectives like 
high and medium high are considered unacceptable positions, 
lower levels are used in trying to achieve the unspoken. 
Trying to keep out American culture because it is bad for 
cultural diversity doesn’t work as a policy. So when it 
fails and increasing American culture finds outlets through 
French trojan horses or through new un-regulated media, like 
internet downloads, it is not surprising. And we cannot be 
fooled by the increasing popularity of French film. This 
only reflects in large part the either a cultural narrowing 
of French pieces or a turn to French films imitating 
Hollywood blockbusters (Cocq and Messerlin 2003: 18, 23) In 
this case when policies and their true objectives do not 
correspond, ineffieciency sets in.  
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Chapter VI. 
CONCLUSION 
 
France because of its cultural traditions, current 
political and economical arrangements with the EU and other 
member countries has created reactionary trade related 
audiovisual policies in order to achieve both stated and 
unstated goals.  
  
 Because of this split in stated and unstated goals 
the policies have the effect of seeming ineffective 
according to the stated objectives, those of preserving the 
French film tradition. Therefore a change is necessary, but 
what type of change?  
 
Should France, or its political elite divulge its true 
goals, should the elite alter their goals, or should they 
alter their policies instead? It has been suggested that a 
need for new policies is required for any success of French 
cultural products (Meunier 1996). If France is interested in 
continuing a cultural tradition they should make it 
desirable outside of France, thus exportable. This does not 
 mean succumbing to the market, only searching french 
tradition and culture for that which has market appeal.  
  
 It also seems prudent that political elite, in 
order to be more in touch with the needs and wants of the 
people of France, give in or even introduce more citizen 
input into the policy making process.   
 
Before any realistic goals with true foundations are 
determined it will be very difficult for France or any 
nation to successfully implement government sponsored or 
subsidised trade related cultural policies.   
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